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days), it will represent the first change in Venezuelan income tax legislation since the adoption of the prior Income Tax Law in 1978. Among
the more important changes introduced by the new tax law are (i) taxation
for the first time of certain passive income by Venezuelan residents derived from foreign sources; (ii) a change of the multi-tiered marginal corporate tax rates to two basic rates of 35 percent and 50 percent (with a
lower-end rate of 15 percent applicable to taxpayers whose net taxable
income does not exceed a statutorily prescribed maximum amount); and
(iii) the establishment for the first time of mandatory consolidation rules
for controlled groups of companies.

Saudi Arabia*
I. Arbitration
Although Saudi Arabia adopted comprehensive modern arbitration regulations in 1983,1 rules implementing these regulations only came into
force two years later. 2 Saudi experience with private sector commercial
arbitration has thus only begun to develop. There is, however, growing
evidence that arbitration is becoming an accepted and efficient means of
resolving private sector commercial disputes, and while no official statistics on the subject appear as yet to have been published, it is apparent
based upon our own practice and upon an informal polling of our colleagues that the number of disputes in arbitration is increasing.
Under the Saudi arbitration scheme, and in keeping with the traditions
of Islamic jurisprudence that have long been a feature of the Saudi legal
system, the relevant judicial authority that would otherwise have had
competence to adjudicate a particular dispute had not resort been made
to arbitration, must as a precondition to the commencement of arbitration

*Prepared by Neal F. Grenley, member of the New York bar and partner of Burlingham
Underwood & Lord, New York. The assistance of Hassan Mahassni, Esq., a member of
the Saudi bar and principal of the Law Office of Hassan Mahassni, Jeddah, where the author
was resident from 1978-1986, is gratefully acknowledged.
I. See Arbitration Regulations, Royal Decree No. M/46 dated 12.7.1403 A.H. (corre-

sponding to April 25, 1983), which became effective on July 3, 1983 [hereinafter Arbitration
Regulations]. Arbitration as a means of dispute resolution is specifically recognized in Islam.
See the Quran, sura (chapter) 4, aya'h (verse) 35.

2. See Rules for Implementation of the Arbitration Regulations, Council of Ministers
Resolution No. 7/2021/M dated 8.9.1405 A.H. (corresponding to May 27,

became effective on June 28, 1985 [hereinafter Arbitration Rules].
VOL. 21, NO. I
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proceedings approve the arbitration agreement, 3 and ratify the decisions
of the arbitrator(s) prior to enforcement thereof. 4 In addition, notices,
service of process, and certain other procedural matters related to the
conduct of an arbitration proceeding must be supervised and in some
instances undertaken by such authority. 5 Notwithstanding the apparent
potential for complexity and delay that the involvement of the Saudi
judicial authorities in arbitration proceedings would seem to imply, experience to date suggests that arbitration proceedings have been administered and awards enforced efficiently and sympathetically by such
authorities.
Clearly the active involvement of the judicial authorities in arbitration
proceedings and procedure was designed by the authors of the Saudi
arbitration legislation to ensure that Shari'ah(Islamic law) precepts would
be respected in the conduct of such proceedings. Consequently, it appears
most unlikely that a Saudi arbitration proceeding would result in a decision
contrary to the Shari'ah or that, if such a decision were rendered, it would
be enforced by the relevant Saudi judicial authority.
In March 1986 the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the Kingdom's central bank, distributed without any accompanying explanation
or commentary two forms of arbitration clauses presumably intended for
inclusion in bank credit agreements. While the principle of mandatory
arbitration in bank related disputes has been unofficially endorsed by
certain Saudi governmental officials, SAMA has as yet offered no guidance on the subject. The implication that SAMA favors arbitration of
banking disputes would appear to be a part of an overall attempt by the
Saudi Government to come to terms with the growing numbers of banking
disputes in litigation at the present time.
II. Banking

The proscription against interest is a basic tenet of the Shari'ah.6 Although increasingly the subject of comment in the international financial
press as more and more banks experience first-hand the practical application of the Shari'ahin Saudi legal proceedings, 7 the interest proscription
3. See Arbitration Regulations, supra note 1, art. 6; Arbitration Rules, supra note 2, arts.
7, 16. Under the Saudi arbitration scheme, it is the nature of the given controversy, rather
than a set of general rules, that determines which particular judicial authority will "supervise" the arbitration proceedings relating to such controversy.
4. See Arbitration Regulations, supra note 1, art. 20.
5. See Arbitration Regulations, supra note 1, art. 8; Arbitration Rules, supra note 2, arts.
9-11.

6. See e.g. the Quran, sura 2, aya'h 275-281, and sura 3, aya'h 130. In Saudi Arabia the
Quranic prohibition against usury is considered as a prohibition against all interest.
7. See e.g., Banks are Caught in Sharia Snare, EUROMONEY, July 1985, at 153.
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remains a fact of life in Saudi Arabia. It was thus with keen interest
throughout the local and offshore banking communities that the Minister
of Commerce promulgated in late 1985 a resolution stating inter alia that
"disputes which arise between banks and their customers out of banking
contracts and transactions concluded or made after the effectiveness of
this Resolution" would be adjudicated by the Legal Committee of the
Ministry of Commerce 8 rather than the Commissions for the Settlement
of Commercial Disputes (the CSCD), Saudi Arabia's commercial courts
of general jurisdiction, or the Negotiable Instruments Offices (the NIO),
specialized courts adjudicating disputes arising out of negotiable instruments (as such term is used in Saudi Arabia's Negotiable Instruments
Regulations). 9 It follows from Resolution No. 822 and from the Arbitration
Regulations referred to previously that in an arbitration proceeding relating to a banking dispute, the Legal Committee rather than the CSCD
or the NIO would be the appropriate judicial authority for purposes of
overseeing such a proceeding and enforcing an award issued therefrom.
As is customary with much of Saudi legislation, no published "legislative history" or accompanying official commentary specifying the purposes or policy objectives of Resolution No. 822 exists. Although it has
been suggested that the Legal Committee might be more favorably disposed than the CSCD or the NIO to enforce an obligation to pay interest,
in view of the virtually complete deference to the Shari'ah traditionally
displayed by the Saudi legal system, the likelihood that the Legal Committee would enforce the payment of interest, either as a trial court or as
the relevant judicial authority in arbitration proceedings, appears remote.
The Legal Committee would not be in a position to treat interest claims
any differently from the CSCD or the NIO without a profound change in
the Saudi view of the Shari'ah, which does not appear to have been
presaged by Resolution No. 822 or otherwise.
In the typical Saudi legal proceeding relating to the payment of bank
indebtedness, the Saudi borrower-defendant requests the bank-plaintiff
to provide a statement of account for the period commencing from the
8. See Minister of Commerce Resolution No. 822 dated 13.4.1406 A.H. (corresponding
to December 25, 1985) [hereinafter Resolution No. 822]. Pursuant to article 3 thereof,
Resolution No. 822 became effective upon its publication in Saudi Arabia's official journal
of record, which occurred on 29.4.1406 A.H. (corresponding to January 10, 1986). The Legal
Committee is comprised of three lawyers employed by or seconded to the Ministry of
Commerce.
9. See Negotiable Instruments Regulations, Royal Decree No. 37 dated I 1.10.1383 A.H.
(corresponding to February 24, 1964) [hereinafter NIR]. Notwithstanding the express provisions of Resolution No. 822, we understand there is some uncertainty as to whether the
NIO will retain primary jurisdiction in respect of negotiable instruments disputes arising
out of banking transactions, with the Legal Committee continuing to have only appellate
jurisdiction with respect thereto.
VOL. 21, NO. I
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beginning of the banking relationship through the date legal proceedings
commenced, and the CSCD or the NIO, as the case may be, usually
orders the bank to produce such a statement. 10 The purpose of this request
is to establish the amount of interest the defendant has previously paid
to the plaintiff. When this amount is determined, the Saudi courts will
treat such previously paid interest as a payment on account of principal
to the plaintiff, and deduct the amount so paid from the amount claimed
as owing by the plaintiff.
In a circular to all Saudi banks issued in September 1986, SAMA, under
whose aegis Saudi banks are regulated, 1 ' stated that it was "imperative"
that requests to banks by the CSCD or the NIO for supplying account
statements made in legal proceedings "be referred to the Agency." 12 No
reason for or consequences of such a referral are provided in the circular,
but the circular notes SAMA's view that many such requests for statements of account are "unjustifiable, for they do not affect the outcome
of the litigation and . .. may be intended for ... prolonging the consideration of the case. . . . Nowhere in the circular does the word "interest"

appear. In view of the recent issuance of the circular, it is not yet known
what effect such a referral would have on the pending legal proceedings
out of which such request arose, or what role SAMA will assume with
respect thereto.
Resolution No. 822 and the two SAMA circulars referred to above are
probably interrelated and represent a coordinated attempt to reconcile
well-established Shari'ah proscriptions with the adverse commercial consequences occasioned thereby on the banks lending to Saudi borrowers.

If the adjudication of banking disputes were transferred exclusively to
the Legal Committee, acting either as a trial court, or as the supervising
judicial authority in respect of arbitration proceedings, or an appellate

court in respect of NIO decisions, it is possible that a more balanced
judicial approach to banking disputes could be achieved. For example,
the Legal Committee could well adopt the view, 13 apparently implicitly

10. At least one decision issued by the Legal Committee sitting as an appeals board in
respect of an NIO decision has held that a defendant's bank account statement is not relevant
to an action by a bank-plaintiff seeking payment of a negotiable instrument. See Decision
No. 31/1405 A.H. dated 18.3.1405 A.H. (corresponding to December 10, 1984). While as a
practical matter Saudi courts often take cognizance of precedents, such courts are not
bound thereby.
11. See Banking Control Law, Royal Decree No. M/15 dated 22.2.1386 A.H. (corresponding to June 11, 1966).
12. See Circular No. 15 l/M/A/8 dated 5.1.1407 A.H. (corresponding to September 9, 1986).
13. See supra note 10. Some years ago the NIO generally refused to "look behind"
otherwise valid negotiable instruments on the grounds that the only proper defenses to
nonpayment by the maker were the invalidity of the instrument on its face, its loss, or fraud.
In indebtedness cases where no negotiable instrument was at issue, the CSCD typically
WINTER 1987
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endorsed by SAMA in its September 1986 circular, that in negotiable
instruments cases, the only relevant issues are the fact and validity of the
negotiable instrument itself. According to this view, defenses related to
the underlying transaction, other than the defense of fraud, and defenses
related to the payment of interest not expressly stipulated in a negotiable
instrument, would not be relevant defenses. 14 It is also possible, although
perhaps less so, that the Legal Committee would permit a bank to recover
as damages in an action on indebtedness its actual costs and expenses
incurred on account of the defendant's nonpayment, such as the actual
cost of funds, overheads, and related administrative expenses.15
It is far too early to predict what impact, if any, Resolution No. 822
and the SAMA circulars will have on the resolution of banking disputes
by Saudi courts. Taken at face value, however, these pronouncements
appear to be an attempt to put in place a legal infrastructure better able
to meld the Shari'ah with the sobering current realities of banking in
Saudi Arabia.
A further aspect of Resolution No. 822 that remains unresolved at the
present time is the precise meaning of "contracts and transactions concluded or made after [January 10, 1986-the date of Resolution No. 822's
effectiveness] ....,,16 For example, in a rescheduling of indebtedness
incurred prior to January 10, 1986, would litigation subsequently arising
out of rescheduling documentation including negotiable instruments entered into and issued after January 10, 1986, be heard by the Legal Committee, or by the judicial authorities competent to hear such disputes prior
to the effectiveness of Resolution No. 822? We have been informally
advised that, at this writing, the Legal Committee has no pending cases
on its docket pursuant to Resolution No. 822, and such questions may
not be resolved for some time.
III. Companies Regulations
The Minister of Commerce has directed that Saudi companies, 17 including those entities having non-Saudi shareholders, must have fiscal
considered the underlying transaction and the existence of interest. The NIO subsequently
moved away from its approach in favor of broader inquiries as to underlying facts.
14. See NIR, supra note 9, art. 48, para. 3 explanatory note.
15. Under the Shari'ah only actual damages would be awarded as opposed to those
categories of damages that are speculative in nature (such as lost profit or lost opportunity).
Theoretically, if a bank could prove it incurred actual costs in funding a loan and could
distinguish such costs from its "return" or "profit" on the loan, recovery of such actual
costs would not be proscribed by the Shari'ah. We are aware of at least one decision issued
by the Board of Grievances, Saudi Arabia's court for claims against the Saudi Government,
allowing such damages in a nonbanking context.
16. See Resolution No. 822, supra note 8, art. 1.
17. See the Companies Regulations, Royal Decree No. M/6 dated 22.3.1385 A.H. (corVOL. 21, NO. I
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years based on Hejira calendar dates rather than Gregorian calendar dates. 18
The Hejira calendar is a Muslim calendar used in Saudi Arabia, among
other places, that is based on a lunar year of six months of twenty-nine

days each and six months of thirty days each; it does not coincide with
the Gregorian calendar. Under current Saudi practice, a Saudi company's
fiscal year is stipulated in its articles of association. The fiscal year of
most Saudi entities with non-Saudi shareholders is based on Gregorian
calendar dates.
Recognizing that its requirement could cause administrative difficulties
to entities that for internal reasons must have a fiscal year of twelve
Gregorian months duration (such as Saudi subsidiaries or affiliates of
offshore entities), the Ministry tempered the effect of its direction somewhat by providing that Gregorian dates corresponding to the required

Hejira dates may be used, and that a company's fiscal year may be measured in terms of Gregorian months. To give effect to the foregoing, the
Ministry has prepared suggested language for inclusion in companies'
articles of association. 19
Based on past Ministry practice, this direction will probably not be
given retroactive effect. It is possible, however, that companies with
Gregorian-based fiscal years will be required to amend the fiscal year
provision of their articles of association whenever they seek to amend
unrelated provisions of their articles of association.

responding to July 20, 1965, as amended by Royal Decree No. M/5 dated 12.2.1387 A.H.
(corresponding to May 21, 1967), and as further amended by Royal Decree No. M/23 dated
28,6.1402 A.H. (corresponding to April 22, 1982).
18. The Minister's direction was contained in a letter dated 23.5.1406 A.H. (corresponding
to February 2, 1986) from the Deputy Minister of Commerce to the Director General of the
various branches of the Ministry of Commerce.
19. The proposed language reads (in English translation): "The first fiscal year of the
Company shall commence as of the date of registration thereof in the Commercial Register
and shall end on ._.____J14....__A.H. (corresponding to ..__...J19._..__A.D.), and each
fiscal year thereafter shall be a period of twelve (12) months." Although the Ministry's letter
expressly indicates that Gregorian months may be used as a means of measuring a fiscal
year, the Ministry's suggested language refers only to "months" and is clearly ambiguous.
In a recent filing to amend an entity's articles of association, we inserted the word "Gregorian" in the Ministry's proposed language to cure the ambiguity. The Ministry refused to
accept this insertion. We have requested, but at this writing have not yet obtained, clarification of this refusal from the Minister of Commerce.
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